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Adoption Reform in Ohio
A COMPREHENSIVE ADOPTION REFORM BILL was considered by the
110th Session of the Ohio General Assembly. Proposed Sub-
stitute House Bill 900 was passed by the. House, but the session con-
cluded before a vote was taken on it by the Senate.' The proposed
Bill would have modified existing procedural aspects of the outmoded
adoption process in Ohio. Rather than take a piecemeal approach the
House had repealed the past adoption laws and proposed an entirely
new Chapter 3107 concerning adoption, and would have amended a
portion of Chapter 51. Besides routinely setting forth definitions,2
outlining procedure,' and setting forth the jurisdiction of the Probate
Court 4 the proposed statute made a number of significant changes.
There was a redefinition of those persons who could be adopted.5
Those who can adopt would have been expanded from "any proper
person" to specific types of persons, including an unmarried adult,
an unmarried father of the person to be adopted and in certain
instances a married person without his spouse joining as petitioner.6
Further, the consent provisions as to whose consent is required7
and whose consent is not required 8 would have been expanded to
include among others, putative fathers in certain specified instances.
In addition, an accounting of all disbursements made with regard to
an adoption would have been required in order to more closely
monitor private adoptions.9 The last area of major change would
have been in the case of refusal of agency consent and the right of
prospective parents who have been refused as adoptive parents to
a declaratory judgment. 10
This note will treat the three areas of the proposed Bill which
seem significant: the need for agency consent in adoption proceedinks;
the rights of putative fathers in adoption proceedings; and indepen-
dent adoptions. While a complete separation of the social and legal
1Sub. H.B. 900, 110th Ohio General Assembly (1973-74) [hereinafter referred to as
"Bill" or "Proposed Bill"). State Representative Harry J. Lehman indicated that the bill
will be reintroduced in the next session of the general assembly in substantially the same
form. Telephone interview with Rep. Harry J. Lehman (D-16), Cleveland, Ohio, January
14, 1975.
2 Proposed Bill § 3107.01.
3 Proposed Bill § 3107.05.
4 Proposed Bill § 3107.04.
5 Proposed Bill § 3107.02.
6 Proposed Bill § 3107.03.
1 Proposed Bill § 3107.06.
8 Proposed Bill § 3107.07.
9 Proposed Bill § 3107.10.
10 Proposed Bill § 5103.161.
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consequences of the proposed changes is not always possible, this
note will focus primarily on the legal ramifications in these particular
areas by sampling the laws of various states with an emphasis on
Ohio law as it relates to the proposed adoption procedure.
Agency Consent in Adoption Proceedings
Consent to an adoption by an agency11 which has custody of a
child is normally not required unless there is a statute specifically
requiring such consent.1 2 Problems arise, however, when such con-
sent is required by the agency 13 and the agency refuses to give its
consent. The consequences of this refusal have been the subject of
some litigation and have been dealt with in various ways by state
legislatures and the courts. In the past, an agency's refusal to con-
sent when statutorily required was most frequently treated as the
final word, thus allowing little room for judicial review. Some courts
considered the agencies or welfare departments to be standing in
loco parentis 14 to the children awarded to them. Under this view
the lack of the agency's consent was analogous to lack of parental
consent, without which consent a valid decree in adoption could not
11 For convenience the term "agency" will be used herein to connote all properly licensed
agencies, welfare departments and similar organizations.
12 See, e.g., In re Adoption of a Minor, 291 N.E.2d 729 (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. 1973); In re
Alexander, 206 So. 2d 452, 453 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968); Anderson v. Pima Cry.
Dept. of Public Welfare, 77 Ariz. 339, 271 P.2d 834 (1954); In re Adoption of McDonald,
43 Cal. 2d 447, 274 P.2d 860 (1954).
13 Consent is normally required of the natural parents unless they voluntarily surrender,
abandon, or willfully fail to support the child, at which time an agency acquires custody,
either temporary or permanent, and thereafter responsibility for the child, including a
right to consent in adoption proceedings if permanent custody has been given to the
agency. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3107.06(D), 2151.03 and 2151.04 (Page 1972).
See also In re Custody of a Minor, 308 N.E.2d 911, 914 (Mass. App. 1974) (in order
for agency to have right to consent, consent of parent must be obviated under specific
statutory conditions then in effect; incompetency is not one of the conditions necessary to
obviate the mother's consent under existing statute therefore the mother's consent cannot
be disregarded); In re G.F.C., Jr., 314 A.2d 486 (D.C. App. Jan. 23, 1974) (abandon-
ment and voluntary failure to support; court also stated that consent was not required
of natural parents if withheld contrary to best interests of child); In re Perez, 14 Ill. App.
3d 1019, 1020, 304 N.E.2d 109, 110-11 (1973) (in order for the court to empower a
guardian to consent to adoption without natural parent's consent, the natural parent must
be found to be unfit as shown by dear and convincing evidence).
14 An individual is said to stand in loco parentis when he assumes the legal obligations of
parenthood without going through the legal formalities of adoption. See 59 AM. JUR. 2d
Parent and Child § 88 (1971) and cases cited therein. A legal guardian stands in loco
parentis. See 39 AM. JUR. 2d Guardian and Ward § 65 (1968) and cases cited therein.
Sturrup v. Mahan, 305 N.E.2d 877, 882 & n. 3 (Ind. 1974). See also In re Adoption of
Wyatt, 4 Ohio Misc. 47, 210 N.E.2d 935 (P. Ct. 1965); Commonwealth v. Gard, 362
Pa. 85, 66 A.2d 300 (1949), rev'g 162 Pa. Super. 415, 421, 58 A.2d 73, 76 (1948)
("guardian has such authority over ward as is necessary for proper execution of the
guardian's duties, however .... rights of the guardian exist solely for the benefit and thus
are not absolute rights to be acceded to in all circumstances, but are rights which may be
regulated, controlled or denied by the court when necessary in the promotion of the best
interests of the ward."); In re Bolling's Adoption, 83 Ohio App. 1, 82 N.E.2d 135 (1948);
State ex rel Frederick, 119 Mont. 143, 173 P.2d 626 (1946).
1975]
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol24/iss1/10
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
be awarded."5 The trend, however, has been towards giving the courts
the power to review the refusal of an agency to consent, either under
statutory revisions or enlightened interpretations of older statutes ;16
this has been particularly true in circumstances where the refusal
has been arbitrary or unreasonable. 7
In general, the courts have overridden agency refusal when it
was based on a single negative factor.1 8 For example, while the age
of the prosective adoptive parents is an important factor for con-
sideration in adoption, it will not be allowed to destroy the opportunity
for adoption if it is the only negative factor. 9 This is particularly true
where the alternative is placement with a public agency.20 Another
important factor is the race of the child and of the adoptive parents.
Many agencies try to avoid problems in this area by not accepting
"'Petition of Sherman, 241 Minn. 447, 63 N.W.2d 573 (1954) (where refusal was con-
clusive even though not supported by evidence of child's best interests); In re Adoption
of Kitchens, 116 Cal. App. 2d 254, 253 P.2d 690 (1953) (agency "assumes the role of
parent, with full rights to and responibilities for the care of the child; . . .that thereafter,
in the role of acting parent, the agency, rather than the natural parent, must give its
consent to the adoption of the child before the court has jurisdiction to award it to the
adopting parents .... ); In re Dougherty's Adoption, 358 Pa. 620, 58 A.2d 77 (1948),
(child's welfare to be considered only after consent requirements met); State ex rel
Frederick v. District Court, 119 Mont. 143, 173 P.2d 626 (1946).
16 Since the overriding objective in nearly all adoption proceedings is the best interest of
the child, some courts construe statutes in such a way as to sustain, rather than defeat,
such an objective. In re Estate of Neil, 187 Neb. 364, 369, 191 N.W.2d 448, 451 (1971)
("Adoption statutes in light of their humanitarian aspects and purposes, are given liberal
rather than strict construction."); Compare In re Barnett's Adoption, 54 Cal. 2d 370, 354
P.2d 18, 6 Cal. Rptr. 562 (1960), and consider the best interest of the child over agency's
consent, or lack of it in Finn v. Finn, 11 Ill. App. 3d 385, 297 N.E.2d 1 (1973), and
Crump v. Montgomery, 220 Md. 515, 154 A.2d 802 (Ct. App. 1959), even where such
refusal is not arbitrary and unreasonable. In re Adoption of D.S., 107 Cal. App. 2d 211,
236 P.2d 821 (1951).
17Lewis v. Louisville & Jefferson Cry. Children's Home, 309 Ky. 655, 218 S.W.2d 683
(Ct. App. 1949); McKinney v. Quertermous, 306 Ky. 169, 206 S.W.2d 473, 474 (Ct.
App. 1947) (court has jurisdiction to grant adoption over objection of Department of
Welfare); in re McKenzie, 197 Minn. 234, 266 N.W. 746 (1936).
18In re Adoption of Tachick, 60 Wis. 2d 540, 548, 210 N.W.2d 865, 869 (1973):
The weight to be given to a factor in determination of best interest of a child
in an adoption case differs from case to case because of its interrelation; a factor
may be almost controlling in a given case and rather insignificant in another
situation.
See also In re Bonez, 50 Misc. 2d 1080, 272 N.Y.S.2d 587 (Fam. Ct. 1966); In re
Barnett's Adoption, 54 Cal. 2d 370, 354 P.2d 18, 6 Cal Rptr. 562 (1960); In re
Adoption of McDonald, 43 Cal. 2d 447, 274 P.2d 860 (1954) (although in this case
several factors were considered).
19
n re Adoption of Tachick, 60 Wis. 2d 540, 210 N.W.2d 865 (1973); In re Haun, 31
Ohio Misc. 9, 277 N.E.2d 258 (C.P. 1971), aff'd, 31 Ohio App. 2d 63, 286 N.E.2d 478
(1972); In re Alexander, 206 So. 2d 452, 453 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968) (age of
parents probably reason for lack of consent, but other evidence indicated that petitioners
were well-suited to be adopting parents of child and best interests of child would be
promoted by such adoption); In re Shields' Adoption, 4 Wis. 2d 219, 89 N.W.2d 827
(1958); Frantum v. Dept. of Pub. Welfare, 214 Md. 100, 133 A.2d 408 (Ct. App.
1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 882 (1957); In re Adoption of Brown, 85 So. 2d 617 (Fla.
1956).
2 0
In re Adoption of Brown, 85 So. 2d 617, 618 (Fla. 1956) quoting from 2 C.J.S. Adoption
of Children § 8 (1972).
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children of a particular race, or, if they do, by making an effort
to match the child with parents of the same race. Again, however,
while race is a relevant and important consideration, it cannot be
the sole ground for refusal of consent in an adoption."
Religion is another factor which is often given careful con-
sideration. But important constitutional questions are presented with
respect to religious requirements, 2 2 particularly where the religious
factor is the sole reason for denial.22 A few states require children
to be placed with parents or agencies of the same religious background
as the natural parents. 24 More frequently statutes take into account
the religions of the parties, and, where practical, the child is placed
with adopting parents of the same faith. 2 While most adoptions affect
children too young to have religious beliefs of their own, the argu-
ment is sometimes made that the natural parent or parents should
be entitled to control the religious training of their child.26 Such
an argument is difficult to justify in light of the fact that the natural
parents are not permitted to control any other aspect of the child's
training after adoption. In fact, natural parents are said to lose all
rights to the child once the adoption has been consummated.
21
Ohio's existing statute28 has no definitive provisions allowing the
court to waive an agency's consent where the agency refused to give
21 In re Adoption of Baker, 117 Ohio App. 26, 185 N.E.2d 51 (1962), wherein the court
approved an adoption of a child of white and Puerto Rican parents by American husband
and Japanese wife, primarily, however, because the child was hard to place. However,
the court said ordinarily a child should be placed in a family having same racial, religious
and cultural backgrounds, but such a placement is not precluded. See also OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 3107.05(E) (Page 1972) (as to statutory requirements); In re Adoption
of a Minor, 228 F.2d 446 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
2Dickens v. Ernesto, 30 N.Y.2d 61, 281 N.E.2d 153, 330 N.Y.S.2d 346 (1972); In re
Adoption of "E", 59 N.J. 36, 279 A.2d 785 (1971), srev'g 112 N.J. Super. 326, 271
A.2d 27 (1970).
2In re McKenzie, 197 Minn. 234, 266 N.W. 746 (1936).
2See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §3795 (Supp. 1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, §
67 (1973) (can only place with adopting parents of different religion with natural parents'
consent); R. I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 14-1-41 (1970) (court shall select person or agency
with same religious faith). However, these types of statutes raise serious constitutional
questions.
2OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.05(E) (Page 1972) (agency report to take into account
religious background); Dickens v. Ernesto, 30 N.Y.2d 61, 281 N.E.2d 153, 330 N.Y.S.2d
346 (1972).
2In re Spence-Chapin Adoption Serv. v. Polk, 29 N.Y.2d 196, 274 N.E.2d 431, 324
N.Y.S.2d 937 (Ct. App. 1971) (so long as mother has not abandoned child nor found
unfit); In re Doe, 167 N.E.2d 396 (Ohio Juv. Ct. 1956).
2OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.13(D) (Page 1972) ("parents ... shall be divested of
all legal rights . . . once child has been legally adopted."); Doe v. Roe, 37 App. Div. 2d
433, 326 N.Y.S.2d 421, 425 (1971) (adoption destroys parental relationship between
child and natural parents and creates a new status between child and adoptive parents).
2OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.06(D) (Page 1972).
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it. The legislature was motivated to cope with the problem of an
agency's refusal as a result of court decisions' treating such refusal. 29
At present, the Ohio statute requires the consent of an agency
that has been given permanent custody of a child by contract with
the parents. 3 The agency is the only one authorized to give such
consent after permanent surrender,3 even if later, in the case of an
illegitimate child, the natural parents marry and wish to rescind such
consent. As previously noted, Ohio's present statutes do not expli-
citly provide a means to contend with an agency's refusal and, until
recently, the Ohio courts strictly construed the applicable statutes
to mean that an adoption is invalid without agency consent in a case
where such consent is necessary.
Nor did the Legislature show any independent inclination towards
changing the situation. Indeed, Section 5103.161 (A) of the proposed
Bill, which would have provided that no agency could deny considera-
tion of an initial application by prospective adopting parents solely
on grounds of race, religion, age, sex, income level or marital status,
29 For a survey of Ohio case law on agency refusal see notes 3 1-53 infra and discussion in the
accompanying text. Wisconsin faced the same problem as Ohio in this situation, and its
legislature followed the same path of reform of its adoption statute. Prior to the Wis-
consin legislation dealing with the circumstances of agency refusal, one Wisconsin court
held in In re Adoption of Tschudy, 267 Wis. 272, 65 N.W.2d 17 (1954), that without
the State Department of Public Welfare's consent, the county court lacked jurisdiction and
could not grant the adoption. The statutory provision in effect at the time provided that
if the permanent care, custody, or guardianship of a child has been judicially transferred
to the State Department of Public Welfare, adoption may be granted on consent of the
Department. This provision was construed by the court to require the consent of the
Department as a necessary prerequisite in order to grant adoption. The court strongly
suggested in dicta that it was powerless to review such a refusal, and therefore, was
compelled to render the judgment against the adoption, although calling upon the
legislature to change the law. The statutory provision with regard to agency consent was
thereafter amended, and the newer statute dispensed with consent if the agency's refusal
was arbitrary, capricious or not based on substantial evidence. This resulted in another
holding by the same court, In re Shields' Adoption, 4 Wis. 2d 219, 89 N.W.2d 827
(1958), wherein it was decided that consent could not be dispensed with merely on a
finding that the child's welfare would be promoted by the adoption. Rather, in order
to dispense with the guardian's consent it would have to be shown either
(1) that the guardian's refusal to consent is not based on a bona fide belief
that such refusal is for the best interests of the child, or (2) that the guardian
has no reasonable basis in fact for believing that the proposed adoption would
be contrary to the child's best interests.
Id. at 224, 89 N.W.2d at 830. The court, however, was not authorized to waive such
consent merely because it disagreed with the guardian's appraisal of the facts in a given
situation. Again, the court in dicta strongly suggested reform in the adoption laws. The
court commented that under the original revision of the provision eliminating the guardian's
absolute veto power over adoption, which was promptly introduced after In re Adoption
of Tschudy, the court would have been authorized to waive the need for the guardian's
consent upon a determination that such refusal was contrary to the best interests of the
child. Instead, the bill, as finally passed, gave the court a more limited power to waive
such consent, and then only upon a finding that the guardian was acting in an arbitrary,
capricious manner or without substantial evidence. Once again, as a result of strong dicta,
the legislature amended the adoption provisions to their present form waiving agency
consent upon a finding that such a refusal would be contrary to the best interests of the
child. WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 48.84-.85 (Supp. 1974).
30 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.06(D) (Page 1972).
31 In re Bolling's Adoption, 83 Ohio App. 1, 82 N.E.2d 135 (1948).
[Vol. 24 :146
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had its genesis in the 1972 case of In re Haun.3 In Haun the prospec-
tive parents were 68 and 55 and had had temporary custody of the
child since birth, and in fact, the child, who had been seriously ill at
birth, had made a substantial recovery under the foster care of the
Hauns. Further, the Hauns previously had been successful foster
parents to over thirty children, had three children of their own, and
were the adoptive parents of one other child. The standards set out
by the agency concerning maturity, stability, financial ability to care
for and love of the child had clearly been met. The agency refused to
give its consent solely on the basis of the age of the petitioners. 33
While recognizing that it is of grave importance to take many
factors into account in determining both the suitability of petitioners
and the best interests of the child, the court concluded that "extra-
ordinary emphasis on a single negative factor in the face of re-
markably unanimous opinion that by all other standards the appellees
[petitioners] are outstandingly qualified . . ."3 is unwarranted, and
the refusal of an agency to consent to an adoption "seems an example
of a loss of the spirit of the whole adoption system while holding to
the letter of part of it. ' '3 1 Even though under the present Code agency
consent is required, 36 the court determined that such denial was
subject to judicial review for a determination as to whether the
agency had acted "unreasonably, arbitrarily or capriciously". The
agency argued that its right was absolute and its consent superior
to all other considerations. However, the court felt that a reasonable
interpretation of Ohio Revised Code Sections 3107.06(D) and
3107.0937 was to give effect to the purposes of both sections, and that
an agency's denial of consent was only one factor, albeit an important
one, for the probate court to consider in its determiniation of the
qualifications of the adoptive parents and best interests of the child.38
The Haun decision was reinforced by a case decided in May of
1974, similarly concerned with the refusal of an agency to consent in
adoption cases. In State ex rel Portage Cty. Welfare Dept. v. Sum-
mers, 9 the Ohio Supreme Court entertained the same question: to
wit, "whether a 'certified organization' as defined in RC 3107.01 (C),
32In re Haun, 31 Ohio Misc. 9, 277 N.E.2d 258 (C.P. 1971), afl'd, 31 Ohio App. 2d 63,
286 N.E.2d 478 (1972).
331d. at 69, 286 N.E.2d at 482.
3 31 Ohio App. 2d at 70, 286 N.E.2d at 482.
35 d. at 70, 286 N.E.2d at 482.
36OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.06(D) (Page 1972).
3 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.09 (Page 1972) requires that adoptive parents be "suitably
qualified to care for and rear the child, and that the best interests of the child will be
promoted by the adoption ......
3841 U. CIN. L. REV. 704 (1972).
3938 Ohio St. 2d 144, 311 N.E.2d 6 (May 8, 1974).
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by its failure to consent to an adoption, can deprive the Probate
Court of jurisdiction over an adoption proceeding. '40 In that case,
Grover and Doris Hanna were the foster parents of the child in
question. The child had been placed with them after her permanent
surrender by her mother to the welfare department in accordance
with Ohio Revised Code Sections 5103.15 and 5103.16. The child,
Antoinette, remained in the Hanna household over two and one-half
years and on several occasions the Hannas allegedly requested the
welfare department to consent to their adoption of the child. The
record did not show whether or not the department ever considered
or rejected their application. In August, 1972, Antoinette was taken
out of the Hanna home and placed in another home, whereupon the
Hannas petitioned for adoption of the child in the Portage County
Probate Court.
In accordance with Ohio Revised Code Section 3107.05, the
welfare department filed its report with the probate court, failing to
recommend the Hannas for adoption of the child for three stated
reasons: (1) hereditary factors, including intellectual potential41
and race;42 (2) economic factors;43 and (3) age factor." In addition,
the report disclosed two other negative factors. The Hannas, accord-
ing to the investigator, had a "preconceived mold" 4 of what a girl
should be, which would thwart the child's natural development. Second,
the investigator indicated that placement of Antoinette with the
Hannas would not be without the consequences of an "upheaval
factor" 46 - that is, not having lived with the Hannas for nearly two
months, replacement with them would retard the child's establishment
411d. at 149, 311 N.E.2d at 10.
41 The report explained "intellectual factor": The child tested at high-average in I.Q.
testing which could probably be even higher in a stimulating environment. The Hannas
were not well educated but recognized the need for college education and offered the oppor-
tunity to their own children. Id, at 145 & n.2, 311 N.E.2d at 8 & n.2.
42 The Hannas are caucasian and Antoinette is black.
43 Mr. Hanna was employed as a plumber with an annual income of $13,500.
"At the date of the report in October, 1972, Antoinette was three years old, and Mr. and
Mrs. Hanna were 51 and 46 years old, respectively.
4- State ex rel Portage Cry. Welfare Dept. v. Summers, 38 Ohio St. 2d 144, 147, 311 N.E.2d
6, 9 (1974), "the Hannas are not attuned to the idea of women's liberation .... seem to
have a rigid, predetermined view of what a girl should be - specifically a petite, shy,
feminine, tiny, little lady like Antoinette. ... "
"Id. at 147-48, 311 N.E.2d at 9. "The upheaval factor refers to the effect on a child separated
from its mother figure." The investigator's "report indicated Antoinette had been out of
the Hanna home for two months, which in enough time for a three year old to transfer
affections to her new family, and felt an evaluation should be made of the effect of
another move on her basic trust, . . ." as it takes a little longer each time a child is
moved to establish his trust in a parent figure again. However, the court indicates that the
upheaval factor in this case "would be the result of a permanent removal of Antoinette
from the Hanna home, rather than a resumption of custody by the mother-figure." Id.
at 148 & n.6, 311 N.E.2d at 9 & n.6, citing Comment, Appendix I, 11 J. FAM. LAW
285, 305-309 (1971), and Inker, Expanding the Rights of Children in Custody and
Adoption Cases, 5 FAM. L. Q. 417,421 (1971).
[Vol. 24 :146
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 19 5
ADOPTION REFORM
of trust in a parent figure. Even with these "negatives", the report
of the investigator's general impressions admitted that the Hannas
were a loving family, they had loved many (fifty-nine) non-related
children in the past, and had successfully provided them with a good
home and a good start in life.47
In December, 1972, a hearing was held in the probate court on the
adoption petition, wherein the welfare department reiterated its
refusal to consent. Nevertheless the court directed counsel for the
Hannas to prepare an interlocutory order granting the Hannas per-
mission for adoption. 48 Before the order was approved, the welfare
department and the Averys49 received an alternative writ of prohibition
from the court of appeals prohibiting the probate court from grant-
ing the interlocutory order of adoption, the court holding this case
was beyond the probate court's jurisdiction "for the reason that the
Portage County Welfare Department has refused to consent to the
adoption as required by Ohio Revised Code Section 3107.06(D)." 5
Thereafter the court of appeals issued a permanent writ of
prohibition.
On appeal the Ohio Supreme Court asserted their authority over
the adoption process holding
that adoption is a function which requires the exercise of
judicial power which is constitutionally vested in the courts
of this state, and that original and exclusive jurisdiction over
adoption proceedings is vested specifically in the Probate
Court pursuant to R. C. Chapter 3107.1l
To hold agencies as final arbiters in adoption proceedings under Ohio
Revised Code Section 3107.06 (D) would
not only be anomalous but would constitute an impermissible
invasion of the Probate Court's power to act in areas which
the Court is specifically vested by statute with authority to
perform its judicial powers granted by the Constitution....
To hold otherwise would leave the fate of the adoptive child
to agency whim or caprice without having the agency's rea-
sons for denying consent adjudicated. 2
41State ex rel Portage Cty. Welfare Dept. v. Summers, 38 Ohio St. 2d 144, 146-47, 311
N.E.2d 6, 8 (1974).
4ld. at 148, 311 N.E.2d at 9.
49 The Averys are the couple with whom Antoinette was placed after she was taken out of the
Hanna home.
s
0State ex rel Portage Cry. Welfare Dept. v. Summers, 48 Ohio St. 2d 144, 148, 311
N.E.2d 6, 9 (1974).
1 Id. at 151, 311 N.E.2d at 11.
52 1d. at 152, 311 N.E.2d at 11.
19751
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol24/iss1/10
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
The court concluded however, that while refusal of consent does
not impair the probate court's jurisdiction, the recommendations and
reports of such agencies are to be considered, along with all other
available evidence, to enable the court to decide in accordance with
Ohio Revised Code Section 3107.09: "(1) whether the petitioner is
suitably qualified to care for and rear the child, and (2) whether the
best interests of the child will be promoted by the adoption.
'53
As previously noted, these cases were the decisive factor in
attempting to change the existing law and the proposed Bill paid
deference to them in those cases where prospective parents are re-
jected solely due to a single negative factor. It would have provided
that, in the event the agency finds the applicants not suitable as
adopting parents, the applicants would have had the right to file a
complaint with the probate court for a declaratory judgment to
determine their suitability.m At the adoption hearing, consideration
would be given to such factors as age, financial and emotional stability,
the ability to care for and love the child, and the best interests of
the child without placing undue weight on any single factor. How-
ever, a finding of suitability by the probate court in such an action
would not confer a right or priority in the applicants in any sub-
sequent placement of a child by a court or agency. Although it is
questionable that prospective adoptive parents should have any rights
to a particular child, it would seem that in cases where they have
fostered the child for a period of time they should have some priority
over the parents or agency who previously gave up the child. Hope-
fully, this consideration would play a role in the court's evaluation
of a child's best interests.55
s Id. Virtually all courts consider the best interests of the child to be the prime, if not the
only, consideration in adoption proceedings even against the interests of the natural and
prospective parents, but such discretion is not without limits. Szemler v. Clements, 202
S.E.2d 880 (Va. 1974); McDonald v. McDonald, 13 Ill. App. 3d 87, 299 N.E.2d 787
(1973); In re Adoption of Hiatt, 69 Wyo. 373, 242 P.2d 214 (1952); In re Griffin, 15
Ohio Supp. 101, 30 Ohio Op. 367 (C.P. 1945). However, a few courts balance com-
peting interests of the child, natural parents, and prospective parents and consider the
welfare of the child the paramount, but not the only consideration in adoption proceedings.
In re Adoption of Keithley, 206 N.W.2d 707 (Iowa 1973); In re Adoption of Tachick,
60 Wis. 2d 540, 210 N.W.2d 865 (1973); In re Adoption of Clark, 183 N.W.2d 179
(Iowa 1971). See also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.09 (Page 1972); In re Adoption of
"E", 59 N.J. 36, 279 A.2d 785 (1971), -rev'g 112 N.J. Super. 326, 271 A.2d 27 (1970).
S4 Proposed Bill § 5103.161(C). This appears to be a novel approach. But see Rockefeller
v. Nickerson, 36 Misc. 2d 869, 233 N.Y.S.2d 314 (Sup. Ct. 1962) wherein the court
implied applicability of mandamus if the agency denial was arbitrary or unreasonable.
5 People ex rel Scrapetta v. Spence-Chapin A.S. 28 N.Y.2d 185, 269 N.E.2d 787, 321
N.Y.S.2d 65 (1971). Four days after birth to an unwed mother, the child known as "Baby
Lenore" was turned over to an adoption agency and shortly thereafter formally surrendered
by the mother to the agency for adoption. About one month later the mother revoked her
consent to the adoption and when refused she filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
requesting return of the child. New York County Supreme Court granted the writ which
decision was affirmed on appeal. In New York, adoptive parents were not allowed to
intervene in this action and to avoid the New York decree the adoptive parents moved
(Continued on next page)
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The proposed Bill specifically would not have required consent
of any legal guardian or lawful custodian, other than the parents,
having permanent custody of a child should such party fail to consent
within thirty days of the request, or who, after examination of his
reasons for withholding consent, is found by the court to be refusing
unreasonably.5 6 By deleting language contained in the present statute
referring to an agency's consent, the proposed Bill would not have
made it as clear as perhaps it could have that such custodian or
guardian includes an agency.5 7 Such implication is obvious when other
sections of the present and proposed provisions are read. Section
3107.08(A) (2) of the proposed Bill referred to agency consent and
further, under present Ohio Revised Code Section 3103.15, which
would not have been revised by the legislature, a parent or parents
could have entered into an agreement surrendering permanent cus-
tody to the agency, thereby empowering the agency to consent to
the adoption, thus bringing such agency under the consent provisions
of the proposed Bill. In addition, Section 5103.161 of the proposed
Bill treating agency refusal as discussed extensively heretofore
obviously considered an agency as one of those whose consent is
required under proper circumstances. Therefore, since it was clearly
the intent to include agencies as one of those classes of "persons"
required to give consent, such inclusion should have been specifically
set forth within proposed Section 3107.06 (A) (3). In the alternative,
"person" should have been defined in Section 3107.01 so as to include
an agency having permanent custody of the child. Either of these
alterations would have dispelled any doubt that, in those cases where
the authority exists, agency consent is required (1) as long as given
within thirty days, and (2) refusal is not unreasonable.
Rights of Putative Fathers in Adoption Proceedings
Traditionally, putative fathers have been given no rights with
respect to the children they have sired.58 In fact, a great many juris-
dictions do not require consent of the putative father, nor is he given
notification of the adoption proceedings, 9 even when he was legally
(Continued from preceding page)
to Florida where they have a right to be heard. Subsequently, in a suit filed in Florida,
the adoptive parents were given custody of the child.
While both courts looked to the best interests of the child, the Florida court was
concerned with the mother-figure, which person is not necessarily the natural mother, and
the upheaval factor. For an excellent anaylsis of these factors see Comment, 11 J. FAM.
LAw 285 (1971). See also Inker, Expanding the Rights of Children in Custody and
Adoption Cases, 5 FAM. L.Q. 417 (197 1); Katz, The Adoption of Baby Lenore: Problems of
Consent and the Role of Lawyers, 5 FAM. L.Q. 405 (1971).
16 Proposed Bill § 3107.07 (F).
57See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.06(D) (Page 1972).
'Doe v. Roe, 37 App. Div. 2d 433, 326 N.Y.S.2d 421 (1971); Thomas v. Children's Aid
Society, 12 Utah 2d 235, 364 P.2d 1029 (1961).
"
9Doe v. Roe, 37 App. Div. 2d 433, 326 N.Y.S.2d 421 (1971).
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obligated to support the child.6" Virtually all jurisdictions require only
the consent of the mother in adoption proceedings61 since she is con-
sidered the sole parent of an illegitimate child.6 2 Even when the natural
mother's rights have been terminated due to her death, unfitness,
voluntary consent or the like, some jurisdictions still refuse to consider
the father's right to be superior even to those of other persons.63
But some more recent decisions have taken the opposite approach,
considering the putative father's rights as superior to those of all
but the mother, subject only to the requirements of his fitness and
the best interests of the child.64
Authorities question the constitutionality of any classification
(particularly where the father is known), wherein the father is
presumed unfit and the mother presumed fit, labeling it unreasonable
with no real basis in fact except expediency in the adoption process.6"
Today's trend sets its mark between these two diverse treatments,
according the putative father some basic rights which may be swept
under the broad scope of the equal protection and due process clauses
of the Constitution.66 However there persists a reluctance of the courts
60Id. at 436, 326 N.Y.S.2d at 425.
61 In re Adoption of Irby, 226 Cal. App. 2d 238, 37 Cal. Rptr. 879, (D.C. App. 1964);
Thomas v. Children's Aid Society, 12 Utah 2d 235, 364 P.2d 1029 (1961).
62The majority position is exemplified in an Oregon statute:
The consent of the mother of the child is sufficient . . . and for all purposes
relating to the adoption of the child the father of the child shall be disregarded
just as if he were dead.
ORE. REV. STAT. § 109.326 (1969), cited in Comment, 13 J. FAM. LAW 115, 119
(1973); See Tabler, Paternal Rights In the Illegitimate Child: Some Legislative Com-
plaints on Behalf of the Unwed Father, 11 J. FAM. LAW 231 (1971) [hereinafter referred
to as Tabler). See also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.06(B) (1) (Page 1972); Franklin
v. English, 126 Ga. App. 400, 190 S.E.2d 919 (1972); In re Doe, 11 N.C. App. 560,
181 S.E.2d 760 (1971); In re Adoption of a Minor, 338 Mass. 635, 156 N.E.2d 801
Sup. Jud. Ct. 1959); Ex Parte Combs, 150, N.E.2d 505 (Ohio C.P. 1958).
631n re Adoption of A, 226 A.2d 823 (Del. 1967), wherein the paternal grandparents
were given superior rights to the putative father's in the adoption of the child after
termination of the natural mother's rights.
"In re Guardianship of Harp, 6 Wash. App. 701, 703, 495 P.2d 1059, 1061 (1972).
Although this right is diluted since no consent of the father or notice is required to be
given to him under common law provisions. In re Aronson, 263 Wis. 604, 58 N.W.2d
553 (1953).
65 Stare ex rel Lewis v. Lutheran Soc. Servs. 47 Wis. 2d 420, 178 N.W.2d 56, 65 (1970)
(dissenting opinion) (also brings in the question, "If a child born out of wedlock has
recognized right to have a mother and a family relationship, why must he be denied a
father?"). See also, Comment 13 J. FAM. LAW 115, 121 (1973); 4 LOYOLA U.L.J. 176,
181-183 (1973). Contra, In re Mark T., 8 Mich. App. 122, 154 N.W.2d 27, 37 (1967)
where the court stated: "The legislative classification has a substantial basis in experience,
is reasonable, and is essential to a workable adoption program."
6See generally Comment, The Emerging Constitutional Protection of the Putative Father's
Parental Rights, 70 MICH. L. REV. 1581 (1972). On the constitutional requisites of:
(1) Notice, see, Comment, 1968 U. ILL. L.F. 232; People ex rel. Slawek v. Covenant
Children's Home, 52 II. 2d 20, 284 N.E.2d 291 (1972). (2) Consent, see,
People ex rel. Slawek v . Covenant Children's Home supra. (3) Custody, see, In re J.H.,
313 A.2d 874 (D.C. App. Jan. 14, 1974) (where there was no evidence indicating that
adoption would not be in the best interests of the child, the lower court erred in denying
(Continued on next page)
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and legislatures to accord the putative father rights equal to those
of the mother."
In the recent landmark case of Stanley v. Illinois68 the Supreme
Court reversed a decision of the Illinois Supreme Court and held the
denial to unwed fathers of a fitness hearing accorded to all other
parents to be a denial of the due process and equal protection clauses
of the Constitution. 69
Although it is too soon to gauge the entire scope of Stanley, the
decision has clearly caused extreme concern in the courts and legis-
latures and has been the subject of commentary in numerous articles.,0
As a result of Stanley, the courts have vacated several decisions which
denied putative father various rights."1 Further, in October, 1972,
representatives of the American Bar Association and Child Welfare
(Continued from preceding page)
petition of adoption by the father of the illegitimate child, where consent of the mother and
agency had been given for the petition to be granted); Marcus, Equal Protection: The
Custody of the Illegitimate Child, 11 J. FAM. LAW 1 (1971); Note, WIS. L. REv. 1262.
(4) Visitation rights, see, 27 OHIO ST. L.J. 738 (1968); Tablet, supra note 62, at 231.
67 State ex rel Lewis v. Lutheran Soc. Servs., 47 Wis. 2d 420, 432-33, 178 N.W.2d 46, 62,
63 (1970), vacated, Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). The court held that lack
of notice to the putative father prior to termination of parental rights, not required under
the Wisconsin statute, does not violate equal protection clause of fourteenth amendment,
and quoted from In re Welfare of Brennan, 270 Minn. 455, 461-62, 134 N.W.2d 126,
131 (1965):
It would appear that because disputes of this kind are not common, the right
of the out-of-wedlock father to notice and to be heard has either been overlooked
or intentionally omitted. This may be explained by historical experience from
which it is assumed that the overwhelming percentage of fathers of out-of-wedlock
children are not interested in their children, in recognizing them, in supporting
them, in legitimating them, or especially in seeking their custody. Moreover,
it should be realistically conceded that few of the fathers in this group would
be able to present anything like a rational argument that the child's best interests
would be served by recognizing the father's desire to obtain custody of the child.
Accordingly, it would appear that the laws with reference to the adoption
of children and the termination of parental rights have been drafted with a
view to facilitating the work of welfare agencies in the adoption process. The
welfare agencies see the procedure used by the father in this action as a threat
to the adoption agency program. They apprehend that if the father can in any
way interfere with the adoption process it may be anticipated that he will
continue to seek custody of the child long after it has been placed in an adoptive
home; that many previous placements may be jeopardized; and that many
qualified couples will, because of the risk, be discouraged from making application
to an agency.
18405 U.S. 645 (1972), rev'g and remanding In re Stanley 45 Ill. 2d 132, 256 N.E.2d
814 (1970).
69 Id.
7 0See, e.g., Comment, 13 J. FAM. LAW 115, (1973); 4 LOYOLA U.L.J. 176 (1973). See also
Hession, Adoptions After "Stanley" - Rights for Father's of Illegitimate Children 1973
ILL. BAR J. 350.
7 Rothstein v. Lutheran Soc. Servs., 405 U.S. 1051; State ex rel Lewis v. Lutheran Soc.
Servs. 47 Wis. 2d 420, 178 N.W.2d 56 (1970). See also Guardianship of Harp, 6 Wash.
App. 701, 495 P.2d 1059, 1062, (App. Div. 1972), wherein court stated it was obvious
"the filiation and adoption statutes are now unconstitutional insofar as they fail to
recognize the newly determined constitutional rights of the father [Stanley]."
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League of America met to study the implications of Stanley, the
result being the promulgation of the following statement with re-
spect to rights of putative fathers:
At the present time there is no unanimity as to the
constitutionally required legal rights of fathers of children
born out of wedlock. There are those who hold that all known
fathers must be notified as part of any action to terminate
parental rights, whether voluntary or judicial. Others hold
that only fathers who have formally or informally acknow-
ledged paternity need to be notified.
The Child Welfare League of America recognizes that
until the legal position is clarified it would be safer, from
a legal standpoint, to notify all known fathers. However, as
the standard-setting agency in child welfare, the League
believes that in order to protect the best interest of the
child, the preferred social policy would be to involve only
those fathers who have either acknowledged paternity or
been so adjudicated.
We, therefore, urge member agencies, and others, to
advocate policies which would accept, as constitutional and
secure, procedures which do not require the involvement of
fathers who have neither acknowledged paternity nor been
adjudicated as such.7 2
Notwithstanding Stanley, Ohio is one of those jurisdictions in
which the mother of an illegitimate child is considered the sole parent
for purposes of consent to the adoption proceedings. 7 3 Since the father
of an illegitimate child is not considered as a parent of such child,
he is also denied the right to notice of the adoption proceedings
in Ohio, as he is fiot one of those whose consent is required in such
proceedings. 4 These provisions are clearly a deprivation of the il-
legitimate father's constitutional rights, particularly those of due
process, i.e. the right to notice and the right to be heard.
A classification is made between the mother and father of an
illegitimate child which presumes the mother is fit and the father
unfit. Such classification has no basis in fact and it is clear that
72 The Child Welfare League Newsletter 1, 6 (Fall-Winter 1972), as cited in Comment, 13
J. FAm. LAw 115, 135-36 (1973).
73OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.06(B) (1) (Page 1972).
74 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.04 (Page 1972). See also In re H, 37 Ohio Misc. 123,
305, N.E.2d 815, 816 (C.P. 1972), wherein an Ohio court in considering the question
of whether the putative father had a right to custody under Stanley, distinguished the
Stanley situation where the father had sired and raised the child, whereas, in this case, the
father had sired but not raised the child. Consequently the court held the father had no
right to custody, as against the mother, noting that the fact the father had not raised
the child was dispositive of the case.
[Vol.24:146
13Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1975
ADOPTION REFORM
a putative father should be put on the same footing as the mother:
he should have the right to consent to the adoption proceedings within
a reasonable time, and should also have the right to notice to such
proceedings. This should be the case whether or not he had been
adjudicated the father. In those cases where the putative father does
care about the disposition of his child he will come forward within
a reasonable time, and where he does not, his rights to notice and
consent can then be waived. However, it cannot be presumed that
he does not care to be notified and heard in such proceedings without
giving him a chance to do so. The argument is frequently made that
the time element of requiring notice to be given and consent required
of a putative father will unduly delay the adoption process. The
fallacy of this position is obvious. The time it takes to process an
adoption is already lengthy; where a reasonable time element is re-
quired to give a concerned father the opportunity to present his
viewpoints the additional time required would be minimal. Further,
it seems ludicrous to deprive a person of his constitutional rights
just to save a few days' time in an already lengthy process.
In response to Stanley and the statement made by the American
Bar Association and Child Welfare League of America, the pro-
ponents of the proposed Bill acknowledged the need for the consent
for adoption of the putative father in two instances. The first situation
which would have required consent occurs when the putative father is
charged with being the father in a bastardy proceeding under Ohio
Revised Code Section 3110.01 or Section 3111.03. 75 The second situation
exists when the putative father has filed an application under Section
2105.18 of the Code acknowledging he is the father of the child. He
may make such an acknowledgment either after marriage to the
mother, whether before or after the birth of the child, or if the father
and mother do not marry, upon consent of the mother or the child's
custodian after the child's birth.76 Although both of these situations
involve court proceedings in which the fatherhood of the child is
ultimately determined by judicial decree as recommended by the
League, it affords no right of consent to putative fathers whose
fatherhood may be in doubt. In addition, both instances require af-
firmative action by the mother, specifically, a complaint charging
bastardy, consent to marry, or acknowledgment that the person alleg-
ing fatherhood is indeed the father. It appears unlikely, particularly
in an illegitimate child adoption situation, that the mother will take
any of these actions. Under proposed Section 3107.05 (A) (9) of the
Bill, the petition of adoption had to contain the name of any individual
whose consent to the adoption is required, but who has not con-
7 Proposed Bill § 3107.06 (A) (6) (1) (consent of putative father required if he is charged
with being a father in a legal proceeding).
76 Proposed Bill § 3107.06(A) (6) (2).
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sented.77 Thus if the mother does not know who the father is, or
should she choose not to reveal the name of the father, file a bastardy
complaint, nor acknowledge the alleged father's fatherhood, consent
will not be required of the father and his name and address will not
be revealed under this section. Notwithstanding the fact that the
father may have met one of the Section 3107.06(A) (6)78 require-
ments, the proposed Bill further would have specified that consent
to adoption is not required of the putative father if he fails to file
an objection with the courts and in some cases even where he does
file such objection.7 9
Besides limiting the situations in which consent of the putative
father is needed, the proposed Bill would have restricted the father's
right to be notified of the adoption. Only if he fell within the scope
of Section 3107.06, or was involved in bastardy or fatherhood proceed-
ings, would the reputed father have received notice.8 0 With these restric-
tive measures the legislature had sought to expedite the adoption
procedure by limiting the rights of certain putative fathers. Whether
the balance they have struck is equitable is a query that must await
the response of future litigation.
But in light of Stanley and its progeny it seems doubtful that
the proposed Bill would have accorded putative fathers their full rights
guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment. An analogous situation
existed in Armstrong v. Manzo81 where the United States Supreme
Court held that a child's father, who was divorced from the child's
mother, was deprived of his rights under the due process clause of
the Constitution when he had not been given notice of the adoption
proceedings of their child. The father had been charged with failing
to contribute to the support of his child, one of the special circum-
stances under Texas law which eliminates the requirement of the
father's consent.82 The mother gave her consent to the adoption, and
the judge of the juvenile court gave his consent in lieu of the father's.
No notice of the filing or pendency of the adoption proceedings was
given to the father, even though his whereabouts were well known to
the mother. The natural father was unaware of the proceedings until
7 Proposed Bill § 3107.05 (A) (9) (petition shall contain the name of any person whose
consent is required even if their consent is withheld, and the reason for such lack of
consent).
78 See text accompanying notes 75 and 76 supra.
79Proposed Bill § 3107.07 (B) (conditions under which consent to adopt is not required of
of the putative father).
800HIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.04 (Page 1972) (conditions for appointing a next friend
to the child and directions for giving notice of a hearing to the child's parents if parent's
consent is required by the statute).
0 Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1964), reu'g and remanding 371 S.W.2d 407
(1965).
82 Id. at 546.
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he received notification of the adoption from the adoptive father
(present husband of the natural mother), whereupon the petitioner
immediately filed a motion to set aside the adoption decree on grounds
that he had not had notice. 3 The Texas court did not vacate the adop-
tion decree, but set a date for a hearing requiring the petitioner to
show that he had not failed to support his child. At the conclusion of
the hearing the court denied the natural father's motion and con-
firmed the adoption decree.8 4 The Supreme Court felt the issue to be
whether failure to notify the father of the pendency of the adoption
proceedings was a deprivation of due process, thereby invalidating
the adoption decree, and if so, whether the hearing on his motion
served to cure its constitutional invalidity.85 The Court stated:
An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process
in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is
notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to
apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and
afford them an opportunity to present their objections. 6
The Court further observed that a subsequent hearing would not have
cured the deficiency since a different burden of proof was required,
specifically, the petitioner had to prove compliance with support
requirements.8 7
Yet under the proposed Bill, even if the putative father had
filed a timely objection, he could have been denied the right of con-
sent to the adoption if the court found any of the grounds set forth
in proposed Section 3107.07 (B) to be present: namely, willful aban-
donment of the child, failure to support the child, or abandonment
of the mother of the child during her pregnancy and up to the time
of either her surrender of the child or the placement of the child in
the home of the petitioner.
Furthermore, the Bill could be criticized for its failure to go far
enough in providing notice and consent to such father since it would
have required affirmative action that the mother may be unwilling to
give. An alternative suggested by Chief Justice Hallows of the Wiscon-
sin Supreme Court in his dissenting opinion in State v. Lutheran Social
Services of Wisconsin and Upper Michigan,8 was to require a mother,
petitioning for termination of parental rights and placing a child
for adoption, to disclose the identity of the father. An appropriate
83 Id. at 548.
4Id. at 548.
85 Id. at 549.
86 1d. at 550, quoting from Miliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940) and others.
87 Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 551 (1964).
8847 Wis. 2d 420, 441-2, 178 N.W.2d 56, 67 (dissenting opinion).
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method could then be employed to notify the father. This relatively
simple provision would enable the father, if inclined, to either con-
sent or object to the proceedings; termination of parental rights would
thus be decided on the merits with input coming from both parents.
If, after reasonable notice requirements had been met, the father
failed to appear, the court could consent on his behalf and only then
would his consent be waived.
It has also been suggested that notice by publication be given in
cases where the mother refuses to name the father. Such publication
would be directed to such unknown respondents in the form, to "All
Whom It May Concern". 9 Of course, a reasonable time would have to
be given for concerned persons to respond, however, those with an
interest in the proceedings would tend to respond quickly. Due pro-
cess could thus be met in a minimum of time and would be strictly
controlled by statute thereby avoiding unnecessary delay in the adop-
tion process - delay which, in the end, can only disturb the child's
well being.
Independent Adoptions
Possibly the most controversial issue raised in the adoption process
involves independent or private placement of children. Not only is
there a paucity of statistical data on this issue, but the nature of the
practice makes difficult attempts to accurately gauge this adoptive
method's extent. What can be ascertained, however, is that the private
adoption of children, through contact with an attorney or physician,
has become a prevalent practice across the country. Although it is
perfectly legal to adopt children privately, 90 some commentators feel
that the practice amounts to buying children, creating a "gray
market" of adoption.91
According to a recent survey,92 the cost of adopting a child
varies greatly, particularly when agencies are bypassed and inde-
89 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 647 & n.9 (1972); Hession, Adoptions After "Stanley"
- Rights for Father's of Illegitimate Children 1973 ILL. BAR J. 350, 354; Comment, 13
J. FAM. LAw 115, 125 (1973).
90OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5103.16 (Page 1972) provides, however, that prior to place-
ment other than through certified agency, natural parent or parents must appear in probate
court to apply for approval of the placement. See also In re McTaggart, 4 Ohio App. 2d
359, 212 N.E.2d 663 (1965). Every state except Connecticut, Delaware, and Maryland
allow private adoptions. Camarow, The Discouraging New Math of Adopting a Child,
MONEY, June, 1974, at 86 [hereinafter referred to as Camarow].
9 Placements made by physicians, lawyers and ministers who, although well meaning cannot
offer the protection of agency and raise price of adoption from hundreds to thousands of
dollars. Note, Moppets on the Market: The Problem of Unregulated Adoptions, 59 YALE
L. J. 715 (1950) (hereinafter referred to as Moppets); Camarow, supra note 90, at 78.
9 Camarow, supra note 90.
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pendent means are employed. 3 Part of this variance results from a
continuously increasing demand to adopt that is largely unsatisfied by
a supply which has been diminishing substantially as a result of
legalized abortions, more unwed mothers willing to keep their illegiti-
mate children and improved birth control methods. 94 While increased
scarcity of children to adopt creates a "rich man's market", it does
have the healthy side effect of increasing the interest of prospective
adopting parents in adoption of children previously considered un-
adoptable, such as foreign, handicapped, older and racially mixed
children.95
Proponents of independent adoptions argue that investigations
made of prospective adopting parents are unnecessarily harsh, agency
standards are too strict and rigid, and exclusive reliance on such
criteria may prevent placement of many adoptable children.96 Added
to these objections is the disheartening time delay that prospective
parents invariably experience during the adoption process. Proponents
also contend that if independent placements are prohibited a "black
market" will be created, or that those wishing to adopt privately will
cross state lines into jurisdictions where it is permitted. The appro-
priate solution they propose is to monitor rather than abolish inde-
pendent adoptions in Ohio.9
On the other hand, those wishing to ban independent adoptions
claim that insufficient investigation goes into the adoption process if
done privately, and, if an investigation is made at all, it is often con-
ducted by a person possessing few, if any, appropriate qualifications.
Furthermore, in independent adoptions it is not uncommon for the
natural parent or parents and adopting parents to have knowledge of
each other's identity which may lead to problems after the adoption.
Often, natural parents, particularly natural mothers in illegitimate
child situations, are not fully apprised of their rights and may consent,
only to try to regain custody of the child at some future date; which,
" Most government agencies are free, while private agencies vary widely from a token $15
to $1,500. However, most agencies are flexible, and may drastically reduce bill to what-
ever the adopting parents can afford. In addition to agency costs, there is a fee charged
by the lawyer who handles the court proceedings, which runs around $250-$350. Most
attorneys handling adoptions in consort with an agency tend to keep their fees down. On
the other hand, fees in private placements are rarely less than $3,000 and may run as high
as $6,000 or $7,000. Camarow, supra note 90, at 80, 84.
94Id. at 78.
9s Id. at 79.
96Issac, Children Who Need Adoption, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Nov. 1963, at 45.
However, as a consequence of reexamination of criteria, there has been some relaxation
of rules, the rationale being, a less than perfect home is better than an institution. Mitchell,
Kentucky Law Relating to Placement of Children for Adoption, 53 KY. L.J. 223 (1965).
See also Uhlenhopp, Adoption in Iowa, 40 IowA L. REv. 228 (1955) for pros and cons
of private placement.
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depending on the circumstances of the consent and the state of the
adoption proceedings, may not be possible.98 A significant argument
against independent adoptions is the fact that some of the placements
border on illegality. 99 Technically, no one should profit in an adoption
proceeding; only legitimate costs, such as expenses for the child's
birth, and fees to lawyers for time expended being permitted, other-
wise, the "gray market" evolves into a "black market.
' 100
In Ohio there are staunch supporters on both sides of the inde-
pendent adoption question. According to recent interviews,"1 the
Franklin County courts highly favor such adoptions, and grant hun-
dreds each year. In contrast, the practice in Cuyahoga County greatly
restricts independent adoptions, allowing an attorney only two such
adoptions annually. Additionally, the Cuyahoga County Probate Court
urges attorneys to cooperate with an agency in an independent adop-
tion thereby hopefully avoiding the pitfalls of such private adoptions.
Unfortunately, this practice makes the adoption more expensive by
adding on the agency's fees, and, in cases where the private adoption
is legitimate and costs are being kept as low as possible, some pro-
spective parents may simply be unable to afford the added cost. For
them it becomes a question of whether the safeguards afforded by
cooperation with an agency are worth the added expense. Rarely is
the decision facile - and too often are the consequences unpleasant.
The present statute with regard to placement of children for
adoption in Ohio allows private adoptions.102 In a case where the child
is not placed or received for adoption through one of the welfare
divisions or authorized agency, the parents of such a child prior to
placement must have "personally applied to, and appeared before,
the probate court of the county in which such parent or parents
reside or in which the person or persons seeking to adopt said child
reside for approval of the proposed placement. .... ,,103 The court after
an independent investigation by a qualified person experienced in
adoption matters may then grant its approval to such an adoption.
This statute would not have been repealed by the enactment of the
proposed Bill, however, it would have been modified somewhat by add-
ing a new section requiring an accounting of all disbursements made or
promised to be made by the prospective adoptive parents in connection
with the child's birth, and services relating to adoption or placement of
"See, e.g., People ex rel Scarpetta v. Spence-Chapin A.S., 28 N.Y.2d 185, 269 N.E.2d 787,
321 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1971).
Camarow, supra note 90, at 86; Mitchell, supra note 96; Uhlenhopp, supra note 96; Moppets,
supra note 91
100 Camarow, supra note 90, at 88.
101 Pape Interview, supra note 97.
102 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5103.16 (Page 1970).
103 Id.
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the child for adoption by any party involved."' Further, the court
would have required that all expenses and fees, including those of
physicians, attorneys, hospitals and agencies, be approved by the
court prior to entry of the decree for adoption.105
The proposed Bill seemed to be an attempt to placate both sides
of the independent adoption question by still allowing private adop-
tions while restricting their operation. It is questionable that taking
a middle of the road position would have been the answer to the
problem. Those persons who charge exorbitant fees and expenses
would certainly not be curtailed by restrictions easily circumvented.
Therefore, a "black market" would still probably persist at a cost even
greater than it is now. On the other hand those persons who genuinely
keep within the guidelines of private adoptions as to costs and the like
will more than likely do so with or without restrictions of any kind.
It would have been wiser to do away with independent adoptions
as they are now conducted even at the risk that persons wishing to
adopt would go outside of the state. Under present practice, it is
strongly urged by some counties to go through agencies anyway.
Despite all the faults of agency adoptions, they do afford safeguards
which independent adoptions do not. Namely, the investigation made
as to prospective adoptive parents is usually more thorough than
court appointed investigations because of time and funds. Further,
greater care is taken to apprise parents, particularly mothers of
illegitimate children, their rights once the adoption takes place, by
thorough counseling of such parents. This, in almost all cases, alle-
viates the problem of a parent's attempt to revoke consent with some-
times dire consequences. Rarely, if ever, do the natural parent and
adoptive parents know each other's identity in an agency placement
whereas in private adoptions identity of each other is likely. Lastly,
the adoptive parents are safeguarded in situations where the child
to be adopted by them through an agency is deformed or undesirable
to them for some other reason. This safeguard is rarely available in
independent adoptions. While it still may take too long and the ques-
tions asked of adoptive parents too rigorous when placements are made
through adoption agencies, it would seem these factors are far out-
weighted by the positive reasons for such adoptions as noted above.
Conclusion
Notwithstanding any other factors in the adoption proceeding,
the prime consideration is the best interests of the child. The House
had gone a long way in its proposed Bill to safeguard and put such
child's interests above all else.
104Proposed Bill § 3107.10(A).
10s Proposed Bill § 3107.10(B).
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In the area of agency consent this concern would have been
probably most apparent. No longer would agencies have been allowed
to give a carte blanche disapproval to an adoption without good rea-
son. Further, prospective adoptive parents would have been given a
right to declaratory judgments where they have been turned down
for one reason or another. In both of those circumstances, it would
have been not only the prospective parents, but the child who bene-
fitted. By allowing the court to look- at the merits of each case and
the people involved, it could have then determined what is best for
the child in a particular instance, not by using arbitrary standards,
but the whole of the circumstances surrounding the adoption.
This would also have been seen in the case of the situation of
putative fathers. When such a father is afforded his rights the child
would also have benefitted. Rather than presuming the father to be
unfit because the child is illegitimate, the father is and should be
presumed fit as is the mother. Instead the best interests of the child
would have been considered as to which if either of the parents should
have custody of the child or give consent to the child's adoption. The
proposed Bill certainly took a step in the right direction in rendering
due process and equal protection rights to fathers in these situations.
However, there are certain deficiencies in that it would have limited
those situations where a putative father's consent is required, denied
his consent in some circumstances and restricted such a father's right
to notification.
Less obvious, but nevertheless a consideration in independent
adoptions, is the best interest test. Needless to say, the chances of
the child growing up normally and in a good environment for that
particular child are greatly enhanced where thorough investigations
are made into the prospective parents and where there is little chance
of identifying the real parents. Further, revocation of consent is not
as likely where the consenting parent is thoroughly apprised of his
rights before the adoption, and there is less chance that a child will be
taken from one home to another until the situation is righted.
The proposed Bill would have alleviated the most glaring problems
in the adoption process. Yet, as noted earlier, there are several areas
which should be given further consideration in the 111th Session. It
cannot be overlooked, however, that the House took positive steps in
revamping the outmoded adoption code, which is definitely a step in
the right direction.10 6
Kathleen Haack Hartley
106For an excellent analysis of present adoption laws and suggested reforms see, Yost,
Adoption Laws of Ohio: A Critical and Comparative Study, 21 CLEVE. ST. L. R. 1 (1972).
As this issue goes to press, the aforementioned proposed Bill is being re-introduced in the
General Assembly as H.B. 156.
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